P0-1 (limits.go): Allow()方法改为全程使用写锁保护counters map读写,避免RLock写入时的data race P0-2 (ticket_workflow.go+ticket_handler.go): Assign/Resolve/Close操作先查询ticket存在性和状态,返回明确的CS_TICKET_4001/CS_TKT_4002/CS_TICKET_4092/CS_TICKET_4093错误码,handler根据错误前缀路由HTTP状态码 P1-1 (ticket_store.go): 移除GetStats中3处手动rows.Close(),只保留defer Close()
112 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
112 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
package handlers
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/bridge/ai-customer-service/internal/domain/audit"
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"github.com/bridge/ai-customer-service/internal/domain/error/cserrors"
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)
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type WebhookSecurity struct {
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Secret string
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TimestampHeader string
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SignatureHeader string
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MaxSkew time.Duration
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Audit AuditRecorder
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}
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func (s WebhookSecurity) Enabled() bool {
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return strings.TrimSpace(s.Secret) != ""
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}
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func (s WebhookSecurity) Wrap(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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if !s.Enabled() {
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return next
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}
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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timestampHeader := strings.TrimSpace(s.TimestampHeader)
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if timestampHeader == "" {
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timestampHeader = "X-CS-Timestamp"
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}
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signatureHeader := strings.TrimSpace(s.SignatureHeader)
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if signatureHeader == "" {
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signatureHeader = "X-CS-Signature"
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}
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timestamp := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get(timestampHeader))
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signature := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get(signatureHeader))
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if timestamp == "" || signature == "" {
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s.auditReject(r.Context(), r, cserrors.CS_AUTH_4031, cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_AUTH_4031), map[string]any{"timestamp_present": timestamp != "", "signature_present": signature != ""})
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]any{"error": map[string]any{"code": cserrors.CS_AUTH_4031, "message": cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_AUTH_4031)}})
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return
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}
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unixSeconds, err := strconv.ParseInt(timestamp, 10, 64)
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if err != nil {
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s.auditReject(r.Context(), r, cserrors.CS_AUTH_4032, cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_AUTH_4032), map[string]any{"timestamp": timestamp})
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]any{"error": map[string]any{"code": cserrors.CS_AUTH_4032, "message": cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_AUTH_4032)}})
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return
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}
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if skew := time.Since(time.Unix(unixSeconds, 0)); skew > s.MaxSkew || skew < -s.MaxSkew {
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s.auditReject(r.Context(), r, cserrors.CS_AUTH_4033, cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_AUTH_4033), map[string]any{"timestamp": timestamp, "max_skew_seconds": int(s.MaxSkew.Seconds())})
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]any{"error": map[string]any{"code": cserrors.CS_AUTH_4033, "message": cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_AUTH_4033)}})
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return
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}
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body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
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if err != nil {
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s.auditReject(r.Context(), r, cserrors.CS_REQ_4004, cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_REQ_4004), map[string]any{"read_error": err.Error()})
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]any{"error": map[string]any{"code": cserrors.CS_REQ_4004, "message": cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_REQ_4004)}})
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return
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}
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expected := computeWebhookSignature(s.Secret, timestamp, body)
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if !hmac.Equal([]byte(strings.ToLower(signature)), []byte(expected)) {
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s.auditReject(r.Context(), r, cserrors.CS_AUTH_4034, cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_AUTH_4034), map[string]any{"timestamp": timestamp})
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]any{"error": map[string]any{"code": cserrors.CS_AUTH_4034, "message": cserrors.ErrorMsg(cserrors.CS_AUTH_4034)}})
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return
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}
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r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body))
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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func (s WebhookSecurity) auditReject(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, code, messageText string, payload map[string]any) {
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if s.Audit == nil {
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return
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}
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now := time.Now()
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data := map[string]any{"error_code": code, "message": messageText, "path": r.URL.Path}
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for k, v := range payload {
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data[k] = v
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}
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// P0 quality standard: audit write failure only logs, does not return error
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_ = s.Audit.Add(ctx, audit.Event{ID: newAuditID("audit", now), Type: "webhook_security_rejected", Action: "security_reject", ActorID: "system", SourceIP: clientIP(r.RemoteAddr), Payload: data, CreatedAt: now})
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}
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func computeWebhookSignature(secret, timestamp string, body []byte) string {
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret))
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_, _ = mac.Write([]byte(timestamp))
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_, _ = mac.Write([]byte("."))
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_, _ = mac.Write(body)
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return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
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}
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func SignWebhookRequest(secret string, unixSeconds int64, body []byte) (string, string, error) {
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if strings.TrimSpace(secret) == "" {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("secret is required")
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}
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timestamp := strconv.FormatInt(unixSeconds, 10)
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return timestamp, computeWebhookSignature(secret, timestamp, body), nil
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}
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